Uninsured Employers Benefits Trust Fund

What they litigate

Disputed issues across the decisions this insurance carrier is named in. Every row opens the decisions it counts.

Where they appear

• Van Nuys 7
• Los Angeles 3
• Marina del Rey 3
• Pomona 3
• Fresno 2
• Anaheim 1
• Bakersfield 1
• Lodi 1
• Long Beach 1
• San Francisco 1
• San Jose 1

How the appealed decisions came out

These are decisions that were appealed and published — the tail of a system that mostly settles. Most claims end in a compromise and release or a stipulation and never reach a panel, so nothing below describes how this insurance carrier does its work. It describes how a set of appealed disputes came out.

• 11 for the applicant
• 9 for the defense
• 4 returned for more record

Counted over 24 appealed decisions. Not this insurance carrier’s book of work.

Decisions

Newest decisions this insurance carrier is named in, each with the passage the panel turned on and a link to the official PDF.

• ADJ12822296 · 2026-03-13 · Anaheim District OfficeJurisdiction / venueremanded

  Determinative passage · p.5Here, it is unclear whether defendant D. the applicant was provided with adequate notice of trial or of subsequent Findings of Fact. D. the applicant was named as an employer in applicant's original Application for Adjudication dated December 12, 2019. Minutes of Hearing from April 2, 2025 state, "uninsured employer not served w/second amended application for adjudication dated 11/18/2020. AA needs to re-serve." The MOH also reflect that trial was set for August 27, 2025. However, the record contains no proof of service demonstrating that D. the applicant was served with the second amended Application, as directed by the WCJ. In addition, the WCJ did not create a record demonstrating that D. the applicant was served with notice of the hearing.

  The WCJ's Findings of Fact were rescinded due to inadequate notice to defendant Domingo the applicant and the need for further proceedings to properly determine employment status and joint employment liability under applicable California workers' compensation law and tests.

  Official decision · page 5 →
• ADJ9098975 · 2025-05-16 · Bakersfield District OfficeAOE/COEapplicant prevailed

  Determinative passage · p.16Finding of Fact, substitute new Findings of Fact, that find that applicant was concurrently employed as a Peace Officer, Occupational Group Number 490, by the County and the Reserve Association on May 4, 2013 while performing in a motocross demonstration at the 2013 Stampede Days and defer all remaining issues.

  Applicant was found to be concurrently employed as a Peace Officer under section 3362.5 during the motocross demonstration, and the County failed to rebut the presumption of employment or prove exclusion under section 3352(a)(9). The WCJ's finding that applicant was a professional athlete was reversed to Peace Officer classification.

  Official decision · page 16 →
• ADJ10037291 · 2025-04-01 · Los Angeles District OfficeJurisdiction / venueapplicant prevailed

  Determinative passage · p.3Turing to the merits, UEBFT cites to Duncan v. Workers Compensation Appeals Bd. (1998) 63 Cal. Comp. Cases 309 [1998 Cal. Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 4510] to support its argument that a proof of claim must be filed in a Chapter 7 asset bankruptcy proceeding while a proof of claim is not necessary in a Chapter 7 no asset bankruptcy proceeding. While that may be true, contrary to UEBTF's argument, failure to file a proof of claim in either an asset or a no asset proceeding does not enjoin an employee from later seeking payment from UEBTF.

  The Appeals Board found that failure to file a proof of claim in the bankruptcy proceedings does not enjoin the applicant from pursuing a workers' compensation claim against the Uninsured Employers Benefits Trust Fund, contrary to UEBTF's argument, based on case law including Ortiz and Slali.

  Official decision · page 3 →
• ADJ12542212 · 2024-09-16 · Los Angeles District OfficeAOE/COEremanded

  Determinative passage · p.1Applicant seeks reconsideration of a workers' compensation administrative law judge's (WCJ) Findings and Order of June 10, 2024, wherein it was found that while employed during a cumulative period ending on August 10, 2019 as a construction or maintenance worker, applicant did not sustain industrial injury as alleged to the lumbar spine, thoracic spine, cervical spine, shoulders, right foot, or in the form of headaches. The WCJ also found that applicant was not entitled to a presumption of injury pursuant to Labor Code section 5402(b). It was thus ordered that applicant take nothing by way of his workers' compensation claim.

  The WCAB found that the WCJ erred in finding no industrial injury and in rejecting the 5402(b) presumption without sufficient evidence of timely denial; the case was remanded for further development of the record on these issues.

  Official decision · page 1 →
• ADJ10054510 · 2024-06-25 · Los Angeles District OfficeAOE/COEdefendant prevailed

  Determinative passage · p.7WHETHER CVS' PROVISION OF A WALKIE-TALKIE AND THE APPLICANT'S COMPLETION OF LOSS PREVENTION PAPERWORK ARE ENOUGH CONTROL TO TRANSFER RISK FROM UNIFIED TO CVS IN ORDER TO MEET THE DEFINITION OF A SPECIAL EMPLOYER.

  The WCJ found CVS was the special employer based on undisputed testimony that CVS controlled the applicant's work activities, including daily instructions, reporting, and discipline, beyond mere provision of equipment and paperwork.

  Official decision · page 7 →
• ADJ8496155 · 2024-04-18 · Lodi District OfficeApportionmentapplicant prevailed

  Determinative passage · p.3In its Petition, UEBTF contends that pursuant to sections 3709, 3709.5, and 3732, it is entitled to a mandatory credit for the applicant's civil settlement recovery. UEBTF asserts that the WCJ erroneously placed the burden upon it to prove "double recovery" between the death benefits that it paid to the applicant and the third party settlement proceeds in order obtain the credit. (Petition, pp. 3-6, citing Lab. Code, § 3709, 3709.5, 3732.) UEBTF argues that, if anything, it was the applicant's burden to prove that the civil suit was unrelated to her husband's industrial injury/death, and that the settlement proceeds thus did not constitute overlapping workers' compensation benefits for which UEBTF could claim credit.

  UEBTF failed to prove entitlement to credit because the civil settlement proceeds received by the decedent's wife were for loss of companionship, a separate claim not compensable as workers' compensation benefits to the deceased employee or dependent.

  Official decision · page 3 →
• ADJ1866471 · 2024-02-02 · Marina del Rey District OfficeJurisdiction / venuedefendant prevailed

  Determinative passage · p.2In seeking reconsideration of the Decision, UEBTF does not allege new evidence that the workers' compensation appeals board (WCAB) "acquired jurisdiction" over PSI and/or Robert Olguin, Jr., and Sandra H. Burke as officers of PSI (collectively referred to as PSI) as required under section 3715, subdivision (e) (section 3715(e)). (Lab. Code, § 3715(e).) Instead, UEBTF contends that because PSI was on "actual notice" of applicant's workers' compensation claim, the WCAB was somehow authorized to issue an award, approve a compromise and release, and record liens against PSI and Roberto Olguin, Jr., as employers of applicant. We disagree for the reasons set forth in the Decision.

  The Appeals Board found that it never acquired jurisdiction over PSI because the formal service and notice requirements were not met, and therefore the prior award and stipulations involving PSI were void ab initio, leading to denial of the petition for reconsideration.

  Official decision · page 2 →
• ADJ10792307 · 2022-05-16 · San Francisco District OfficePermanent disability ratingapplicant prevailed

  Determinative passage · p.1UEBTF seeks reconsideration of the December 23, 2021 Findings of Fact and Award, wherein the workers' compensation administrative law judge (WCJ) found, in pertinent part, that applicant is 70% permanently disabled due to his industrial injury.

  The WCJ's finding that the psychiatric injury is compensable as a direct injury and/or a compensable consequence was upheld, and the exceptions to section 4660.1(c) for violent acts and catastrophic injuries applied, supporting the 70% permanent disability rating including psychiatric impairment.

  Official decision · page 1 →
• ADJ8023051 · 2021-11-22 · Van Nuys District OfficeJurisdiction / venueapplicant prevailed

  Determinative passage · p.1Defendant seeks reconsideration of the Findings and Order issued on August 24, 2021 by a workers' compensation administrative law judge (WCJ). The WCJ found and ordered that applicant's claim against Bovee is not barred by the doctrine of res judicata.

  The WCJ and WCAB found that defendant Bovee was not in privity with McCandless, the party to the prior C&R, and therefore res judicata did not bar the applicant's claim against Bovee.

  Official decision · page 1 →
• ADJ3354072 · 2026-06-16 · Pomona District OfficeReconsideration / removaldefendant prevailed

  Determinative passage · p.1Removal is an extraordinary remedy rarely exercised by the Appeals Board. (the applicant v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 596, 599, fn. 5 [71 Cal.Comp.Cases 155]; Kleemann v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 274, 280, fn. 2 [70 Cal.Comp.Cases 133].) The Appeals Board will grant removal only if the petitioner shows that substantial prejudice or irreparable harm will result if removal is not granted. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, 10955(a); see also the applicant, supra; Kleemann, supra.) Also, the petitioner must demonstrate that reconsideration will not be an adequate remedy if a final decision adverse to the petitioner

  The Appeals Board found that the petitioner did not show substantial prejudice or irreparable harm if removal was denied and that reconsideration would be an adequate remedy if the matter proceeds to a final decision adverse to petitioner.

  Official decision · page 1 →
• ADJ15627821 · 2025-10-10 · Van Nuys District OfficeReconsideration / removalapplicant prevailed

  Determinative passage · p.1UEBTF contends that trial is not appropriate at this time because all necessary parties to the proceeding have not been joined and that not all parties received notice of the mandatory settlement conference (MSC). UEBTF further contends that applicant amended the application for adjudication at the MSC to allege a specific injury, rather than a cumulative injury, and thus UEBTF is entitled to seek additional discovery on that issue prior to trial.

  Removal granted because not all necessary parties were joined and not all parties received notice of the mandatory settlement conference, constituting irreparable harm and violation of due process rights.

  Official decision · page 1 →
• ADJ10616244 · 2024-09-30 · Marina del Rey District OfficeReconsideration / removaldefendant prevailed

  Determinative passage · p.5II. A petition for reconsideration may properly be taken only from a "final" order, decision, or award. (Lab. Code, § 5900(a), 5902, 5903.) A "final" order has been defined as one that either "determines any substantive right or liability of those involved in the case" (Rymer v. Hagler (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1171, 1180; Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (Pointer) (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 528, 534-535 [45 Cal.Comp.Cases 410]; Kaiser Foundation Hospitals v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (Kramer) (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 39, 45 [43 Cal.Comp.Cases 661]) or determines a "threshold" issue that is fundamental to the claim for benefits. (Maranian v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1070, 1075 [65 Cal.Comp.Cases 650].) Interlocutory procedural or evidentiary decisions, entered in the midst of the workers' compensation proceedings, are not considered "final" orders. (Id., at 1075 ["interim orders, which do not decide a threshold issue, such as intermediate procedural or evidentiary decisions, are not `final' "]; Rymer, supra, 211 Cal.App.3d at p.

  The Appeals Board's decision rescinding the WCJ's order and returning the matter for further proceedings was not a final decision, so the petitions for reconsideration were properly dismissed.

  Official decision · page 5 →

Also recorded as

The same insurance carrier is printed several ways across the decisions, and all of them were counted as one. This is every spelling behind the figures above.

• UNINSURED EMPLOYERS BENEFITS TRUST FUND
• Uninsured Employers Benefits Trust Fund

Is this your company and something here is wrong? Tell us and we will fix it. Every figure on this page is a count of released decisions this insurance carrier is named in, and the decisions themselves are listed above with the passage each turned on.