ADJ10326531 · July 21, 2026

The WCJ found the applicant sustained an industrial injury based on the medical opinion of AME Dr. Ronald Kent, and the claim was timely filed within the statute of limitations, supported by credible testimony of claim form filing and the presumption of compensability under Labor Code §5402.

From the decision · page 1Defendant seeks reconsideration of a workers’ compensation administrative law judge’s (WCJ) Findings and Award and Order of April 17, 2026, wherein it was found that while employed as a carpenter during a cumulative period comprising the day December 29, 2014, applicant sustained injury to his left upper extremity, left lower extremity and nervous system, but not to “urology” and to the psyche causing the need for further medical treatment. In finding industrial injury, it was found that applicant’s claim was not barred by the statute of limitations. All other issues were deferred. Defendant contends that the WCJ erred in finding industrial injury, arguing that the WCJ erred in not finding the claim barred by the statute of limitations and arguing that the WCJ erred in following the opinions of agreed medical evaluator neurologist Ronald N. Kent, M.D. rather than the opinions of internist qualified medical evaluator Minal Borsada, M.D. We have received an answer, and the WCJ has filed a Report and Recommendation on Petition for Reconsideration (Report). We will affirm the substance of the WCJ’s decision for the reasons stated below and for the reasons stated in the Report quoted below. However, we will grant reconsideration and amend the WCJ’s decision to correct a typographical error in the Stipulated Facts.

Applicant's wife filed a claim form with the employer in October 2015, tolling the statute of limitations.

Favours Applicant prevailed

This filing tolled the statute of limitations, making the claim timely.

From the decision · page 3(c).) A claim is timely if it is filed within a year of the latest of these three points. Here, applicant was not provided medical or disability benefits, so the applicable date is the date of injury. However, applicant’s wife testified that within a year of the date of injury, prior to the expiration of the one-year Labor Code section 5405(a) statute of limitations, she filed a DWC-1 claim form with the employer in October of 2015. (Minutes of Hearing and Summary of Evidence of February 5, 2026 trial at pp. 8-9.) The WCJ found this testimony credible and unrebutted. (Opinion on Decision at p. 5.) Labor Code section 5401(d) flatly states that, “Filing of the claim form with the employer shall toll, for injuries occurring on or after January 1, 1994, the time limitations set forth in Sections 5405 and 5406 until the claim is denied by the employer or the injury becomes presumptively compensable pursuant to Section 5402.” Thus, applicant had one year from the earlier of receiving a denial or the expiration of the 90-day period to issue the denial to file an application for adjudication. The 90-day period expired in January 2016. The filing of the Application for Adjudication on March 16, 2016 was well within one year of that date.

AME Dr. Ronald Kent's medical opinion found the stroke industrially caused by work activities on December 29, 2014.

Favours Applicant prevailed

The WCJ and WCAB relied on Dr. Kent's opinion as substantial evidence to find industrial injury.

From the decision · page 4Accordingly, regardless of whether applicant’s claim is categorized as a specific or cumulative injury, the claim was timely. With regard to the issue of whether the WCJ erred in relying on the medical opinions of AME Dr. Kent, the relevant and considered opinion of one physician, though inconsistent with other medical opinions, may constitute substantial evidence. (Le Vesque v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd. (1970) 1 Cal.3d 627, 639 [35 Cal.Comp.Cases 16].) The WCJ is empowered to choose among conflicting medical reports and rely on those deemed most persuasive. (Jones v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd. (1968) 68 Cal.2d 476, 479 [33 Cal.Comp.Cases 221].) Additionally, in reviewing the issues presented here, we presume that the agreed medical evaluator has been chosen by the parties because of his expertise and neutrality. “[W]orkers’ compensation law favors agreed medical [evaluators] in resolving medical disputes fairly and expeditiously.” (Green v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd.

Found the applicant's stroke was industrially caused by work activities on December 29, 2014, and supported the finding of injury to left upper extremity, left lower extremity, and nervous system. His opinion was found persuasive over the PQME's opinion.

The WCJ and WCAB found Dr. Kent's opinion persuasive and substantial medical evidence, despite conflicting opinions from PQME Dr. Borsada, because Dr. Kent's expertise as a neurologist and his detailed causation analysis were more convincing.

From the decision · page 4Accordingly, regardless of whether applicant’s claim is categorized as a specific or cumulative injury, the claim was timely. With regard to the issue of whether the WCJ erred in relying on the medical opinions of AME Dr. Kent, the relevant and considered opinion of one physician, though inconsistent with other medical opinions, may constitute substantial evidence. (Le Vesque v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd. (1970) 1 Cal.3d 627, 639 [35 Cal.Comp.Cases 16].) The WCJ is empowered to choose among conflicting medical reports and rely on those deemed most persuasive. (Jones v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd. (1968) 68 Cal.2d 476, 479 [33 Cal.Comp.Cases 221].) Additionally, in reviewing the issues presented here, we presume that the agreed medical evaluator has been chosen by the parties because of his expertise and neutrality. “[W]orkers’ compensation law favors agreed medical [evaluators] in resolving medical disputes fairly and expeditiously.” (Green v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd.

Diagnosed the applicant with MCA hemorrhage non-industrial and attributed the stroke to moyamoya disease, but her opinion was found speculative and not based on reasonable medical probability, thus not substantial evidence.

The WCJ and WCAB rejected Dr. Borsada's opinion because it was speculative, lacked reasonable medical probability, and did not sufficiently explain causation, despite her experience and research.

From the decision · page 4Accordingly, regardless of whether applicant’s claim is categorized as a specific or cumulative injury, the claim was timely. With regard to the issue of whether the WCJ erred in relying on the medical opinions of AME Dr. Kent, the relevant and considered opinion of one physician, though inconsistent with other medical opinions, may constitute substantial evidence. (Le Vesque v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd. (1970) 1 Cal.3d 627, 639 [35 Cal.Comp.Cases 16].) The WCJ is empowered to choose among conflicting medical reports and rely on those deemed most persuasive. (Jones v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd. (1968) 68 Cal.2d 476, 479 [33 Cal.Comp.Cases 221].) Additionally, in reviewing the issues presented here, we presume that the agreed medical evaluator has been chosen by the parties because of his expertise and neutrality. “[W]orkers’ compensation law favors agreed medical [evaluators] in resolving medical disputes fairly and expeditiously.” (Green v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd.

Labor Code §5405

A claim is timely if filed within one year of the latest of the date of injury, last payment of disability indemnity, or last date medical treatment was furnished, per Labor Code section 5405.

The claim was timely filed within one year of the date of injury as no medical or disability benefits were provided.

From the decision · page 38 [50 Cal.Comp.Cases 411].) The burden is on defendant to show when the statute of limitations began to run, “starting from any and all three points designated [in Labor Code section 5405].” (Colonial Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com. (Nickles) (1945) 27 Cal.2d 437, 441 [10 Cal.Comp.Cases 321].) The three points designated in section 5405 are date of injury (Lab. Code, § 5405, subd. (a)); the last payment of disability indemnity (Lab. Code, § 5405, subd. (b)); and the last date on which medical treatment benefits were furnished (Lab. Code, § 5405, subd.

Labor Code §5401(d)

Filing of a claim form with the employer tolls the statute of limitations until denial or presumption of compensability, per Labor Code section 5401(d).

Applicant's wife filed a claim form in October 2015, tolling the statute of limitations.

From the decision · page 3(c).) A claim is timely if it is filed within a year of the latest of these three points. Here, applicant was not provided medical or disability benefits, so the applicable date is the date of injury. However, applicant’s wife testified that within a year of the date of injury, prior to the expiration of the one-year Labor Code section 5405(a) statute of limitations, she filed a DWC-1 claim form with the employer in October of 2015. (Minutes of Hearing and Summary of Evidence of February 5, 2026 trial at pp. 8-9.) The WCJ found this testimony credible and unrebutted. (Opinion on Decision at p. 5.) Labor Code section 5401(d) flatly states that, “Filing of the claim form with the employer shall toll, for injuries occurring on or after January 1, 1994, the time limitations set forth in Sections 5405 and 5406 until the claim is denied by the employer or the injury becomes presumptively compensable pursuant to Section 5402.” Thus, applicant had one year from the earlier of receiving a denial or the expiration of the 90-day period to issue the denial to file an application for adjudication. The 90-day period expired in January 2016. The filing of the Application for Adjudication on March 16, 2016 was well within one year of that date.

Labor Code §5402

If liability is not rejected within 90 days after claim form filing, injury is presumed compensable, per Labor Code section 5402.

Liability was not rejected within 90 days, so injury is presumed compensable shifting burden to defendant to prove non-industrial causation.

From the decision · page 10This issue was raised by applicant at the time of trial but was rendered moot when the undersigned found industrial causation based on AME Kent. However, to the extent that petitioner is contending that the undersigned should not have relied on AME Kent, it is important to also address whether or not applicant’s injury should be presumed compensable. Even though the issue was deemed moot, the undersigned did nevertheless address this in its Opinion on Decision. Specifically, Labor Code §5402 states, “[i]f liability is not rejected within 90 days after the date the claim form is filed under Section 5401, the injury shall be presumed compensable.” That said, Labor Code §5401(d) states “a claim form is deemed filed when it is personally delivered to the employer or mailed to the employer by first-class or certified mail”. Here, based on the unrebutted and undisputed testimony of applicant’s wife, a claim form was mailed to the employer in 10/2015.

Credible and unrebutted testimony of applicant's wife that a claim form was filed with the employer in October 2015, tolling the statute of limitations.

From the decision · page 3(c).) A claim is timely if it is filed within a year of the latest of these three points. Here, applicant was not provided medical or disability benefits, so the applicable date is the date of injury. However, applicant’s wife testified that within a year of the date of injury, prior to the expiration of the one-year Labor Code section 5405(a) statute of limitations, she filed a DWC-1 claim form with the employer in October of 2015. (Minutes of Hearing and Summary of Evidence of February 5, 2026 trial at pp. 8-9.) The WCJ found this testimony credible and unrebutted. (Opinion on Decision at p. 5.) Labor Code section 5401(d) flatly states that, “Filing of the claim form with the employer shall toll, for injuries occurring on or after January 1, 1994, the time limitations set forth in Sections 5405 and 5406 until the claim is denied by the employer or the injury becomes presumptively compensable pursuant to Section 5402.” Thus, applicant had one year from the earlier of receiving a denial or the expiration of the 90-day period to issue the denial to file an application for adjudication. The 90-day period expired in January 2016. The filing of the Application for Adjudication on March 16, 2016 was well within one year of that date.