ADJ10436761 · December 26, 2025

The Appeals Board found the WCJ's analysis incomplete regarding whether the applicant sustained a compensable psyche injury and whether the good faith personnel action defense applied, requiring further medical evidence and analysis.

From the decision · page 7II. Applicant asserts in his petition that the WCJ erred in determining that he did not sustain industrial injury to his psyche based upon a finding that his claim is barred by the good faith personnel defense pursuant to Section 3208.3(h). Section 3208.3 governs claims for psychiatric injury. To establish that a psychological injury is compensable, an injured worker must show by

The WCJ's analysis was incomplete regarding whether the applicant sustained a compensable psyche injury and the application of the good faith personnel action defense.

Favours Applicant prevailed

This incomplete analysis required further medical evidence and factual findings, leading to the remand for further proceedings.

From the decision · page 9While the AME has opined that it is reasonably medically probable that the applicant's major depressive disorder was predominantly caused (51%) by actual events of employment, thus satisfying the first and second steps in Rolda, we are not satisfied that the WCJ's F&O is supported in the record.

Found industrial psychiatric causation with predominance, apportioned 75% industrial and 25% non-industrial causes, and opined that supervisor's conduct represented bad faith personnel actions.

The AME's opinion was found lacking in substantial evidence and incomplete by the WCJ and Appeals Board, requiring further development.

From the decision · page 5Four reports by AME in psychiatry, Dr. Arnold Gilberg, were entered into evidence at the trial in 2021. In the report of March 20, 2019, Dr. Gilberg stated that applicant had "industrial psychiatric causation with predominance." (Ex. Z, Medical Report from Dr. Arnold Gilberg, dated 3/20/19, p. 14.) He concluded that applicant's psychological difficulties were "centered around" Ortega's lack of appropriate supervision of applicant and that many other workers who were supervised by Ortega had left employment as well. (Ex. Z, p. 14.) Ortega's conduct with applicant and other co-workers indicated bad faith personnel actions. (Ex. Z, p. 14.) Dr. Gilberg apportioned 75% of applicant's psychological problems as industrial and 25% as non-industrial, including stressors such as divorce, custody, and other issues. (Ex. Z, p. 14.) In the AME supplemental report of June 10, 2019, Dr. Gilberg requested additional information before performing a full analysis under Rolda. (Ex. Y, Medical Report from Dr. Arnold Gilberg, dated 6/10/19, p. 2.)

Found major depressive disorder predominantly caused by employment stress but deferred final compensability decision pending factual findings on good faith personnel actions; identified multiple non-industrial stressors and reached MMI.

The AME's report identified multiple causal factors and deferred final compensability to the trier of fact; the Appeals Board found the WCJ's analysis incomplete and remanded for further proceedings.

From the decision · page 9In his October 11, 2022 AME report, Dr. Sones stated that it was reasonably medically probable that the predominant cause amongst all causes of applicant's Major Depressive disorder was his perception of stress at his employment at defendant but that some or all of the events applicant regarded as stressful may have been lawful, nondiscriminatory, good-faith personnel actions. (Ex. WWW, Medical Report from Dr. David Sones, dated 10/11/22, p. 45.) Dr. Sones concluded that it is reasonably medically probable that his Major Depressive Disorder was caused by the following factors:

Rolda (2001) 66 Cal.Comp.Cases 241 (Appeals Board en banc)

Rolda analysis for psychiatric injury compensability

The WCJ must determine whether the psychiatric injury involves actual events of employment, whether those events predominantly caused the injury, whether any personnel actions were lawful and in good faith, and whether such actions were a substantial cause of the injury.

From the decision · page 8(2001) 66 Cal.Comp.Cases 241, 242 (Appeals Board en banc) (Rolda).) Under this analysis, the WCJ must first consider all the medical evidence and the other documentary and testimonial evidence of record and then determine: (1) whether the alleged psychiatric injury involves actual events of employment, a factual/legal determination for the WCJ; (2) if so, whether such actual events were the predominant cause of the psychiatric injury, a determination which requires competent medical evidence; (3) if so, a further determination must be made establishing whether any of the actual employment events were personnel actions that were lawful, nondiscriminatory and in good faith - a factual/legal determination for the WCJ; and (4) if so, a determination must be made as to whether the lawful, nondiscriminatory, good faith personnel actions were a "substantial cause" of the psychiatric injury. (Rolda, supra, 66 Cal.Comp.Cases at p. 247; see also San Francisco Unified School Dist. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (Cardozo), supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 9.) Section 3208.3 defines "substantial cause" as "at least 35 to 40 percent of the causation from all sources combined." (Lab. Code, § 3208.3(b)(3).)

Labor Code section 3208.3(b)(3)

Definition of substantial cause as at least 35 to 40 percent causation

Defines substantial cause for psychiatric injury compensability analysis under Rolda.

From the decision · page 8(2001) 66 Cal.Comp.Cases 241, 242 (Appeals Board en banc) (Rolda).) Under this analysis, the WCJ must first consider all the medical evidence and the other documentary and testimonial evidence of record and then determine: (1) whether the alleged psychiatric injury involves actual events of employment, a factual/legal determination for the WCJ; (2) if so, whether such actual events were the predominant cause of the psychiatric injury, a determination which requires competent medical evidence; (3) if so, a further determination must be made establishing whether any of the actual employment events were personnel actions that were lawful, nondiscriminatory and in good faith - a factual/legal determination for the WCJ; and (4) if so, a determination must be made as to whether the lawful, nondiscriminatory, good faith personnel actions were a "substantial cause" of the psychiatric injury. (Rolda, supra, 66 Cal.Comp.Cases at p. 247; see also San Francisco Unified School Dist. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (Cardozo), supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 9.) Section 3208.3 defines "substantial cause" as "at least 35 to 40 percent of the causation from all sources combined." (Lab. Code, § 3208.3(b)(3).)

Applicant's testimony about supervisor Ortega's conduct including berating, micromanagement, and removal of staff

From the decision · page 2At trial, applicant testified that that he began working for defendant in September 1987, as a clerk, and was promoted every year until his present position. (1/14/21 Minutes of Hearing/ Summary of Evidence (MOH/SOE), p. 4.) He had no problems or issues at work until 2013. (1/14/21 MOH/SOE, p. 4.) He worked in the Department of Mental Health as a principal analyst and was supervised by John Ortega as of 2013. (1/14/21 MOH/SOE, p. 4.) When he had been working at the Department of Mental Health for about three months, Ortega berated him in a meeting in front of management, colleagues, and others. (1/14/21 MOH/SOE, pp. 4-5.) Applicant had just been assigned a new project at that time and his former boss, Greenless, objected to Ortega's comments and offered the assistance of his secretary with the new project. (1/14/21 MOH/SOE, p. 5.) Ortega also took applicant's staff away and made the staff report to Ortega. (1/14/21 MOH/SOE, p. 5.) Applicant was a program manager for about eight months and was given no tools or support to complete the program. (1/14/21 MOH/SOE, p. 5.) Further, Ortega took away his bathroom key so applicant had to take the elevator to a different floor to use the public restroom, and pulled applicant's time cards and counted every minute that he was late from lunch and break which resulted in applicant losing eight months of time. (1/14/21 MOH/SOE, pp. 4-6.)

Employer's witness testimony and documentary evidence of disciplinary actions and performance issues

From the decision · page 3John Ortega testified at trial that he was employed by defendant as the Division Chief of Data Management and Business Intelligence Division for the Department of Mental Health. (2/22/21 MOH/SOE, p. 3.) Applicant was hired in January 2013; his supervisor was Roxanne Lockett for a year and a half and then Ortega became his supervisor. (2/22/21 MOH/SOE, p. 3.) Ortega testified that he was aware that applicant left work early and was untimely with assignments while Lockett was applicant's supervisor. (2/22/21 MOH/SOE, pp. 3-4.) Lockett sent a warning to applicant in approximately December 2013, regarding leaving early without getting permission.