ADJ15580972 · August 11, 2026

The WCJ's order vacating the dismissal was interlocutory and not final, so reconsideration was improper; removal was granted due to significant prejudice and to consolidate venue and assignment to the same WCJ.

From the decision · page 3II. A petition for reconsideration may properly be taken only from a “final” order, decision, or award. (Lab. Code, §§ 5900(a), 5902, 5903.) A “final” order has been defined as one that either “determines any substantive right or liability of those involved in the case” (Rymer v. Hagler (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1171, 1180; Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (Pointer) (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 528, 534-535 [45 Cal.Comp.Cases 410]; Kaiser Foundation Hospitals v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (Kramer) (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 39, 45 [43 Cal.Comp.Cases 661]) or determines a “threshold” issue that is fundamental to the claim for benefits. (Maranian v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1070, 1075 [65 Cal.Comp.Cases 650].) Interlocutory procedural or evidentiary decisions, entered in the midst of the workers’ compensation proceedings, are not considered “final” orders. (Id. at p.

The WCJ's order vacating the dismissal was interlocutory and not a final order.

Favours Defendant prevailed

Because reconsideration may only be taken from a final order, the petition for reconsideration was dismissed.

From the decision · page 31075 [“interim orders, which do not decide a threshold issue, such as intermediate procedural or evidentiary decisions, are not ‘final’ ”]; Rymer, supra, at p. 1180 [“[t]he term [‘final’] does not include intermediate procedural orders or discovery orders”]; Kramer, supra, at p. 45 [“[t]he term [‘final’] does not include intermediate procedural orders”].) Such interlocutory decisions include, but are not limited to, pre-trial orders regarding evidence, discovery, trial setting, venue, or similar issues. Here, defendant seeks reconsideration of the WCJ’s Order to vacate a prior order dismissing the case. The WCJ’s decision to vacate an order dismissing a case solely resolves an intermediate procedural or evidentiary issue or issues. The decision does not determine any

The two cases involve the same applicant, same defendant, and same body part injury.

Favours Defendant prevailed

This justified consolidation to avoid duplicate or inconsistent orders and for judicial efficiency.

Significant prejudice or irreparable harm would result if venue and assignment were not consolidated.

Favours Defendant prevailed

This supported granting removal as an extraordinary remedy to prevent harm and ensure fairness.

From the decision · page 5It is a principle of statutory construction that the word “shall,” as used in the Labor Code, ordinarily connotes a mandatory duty. (Lab. Code, § 15 [“‘[s]hall’ is mandatory and ‘may’ is permissive”]; see also, Jones v. Tracy School Dist. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 99, 109; Morris v. County of Marin (1977) 18 Cal.3d 901, 907.) Applying this principle to section 5700, the same WCJ must continue to be assigned to hear any subsequent matters related to issues previously heard by them. Applying the legal principles above, we conclude that in addition to consolidating the two cases, both cases must be venued in Long Beach so that WCJ Zoellner shall continue to hear the matters. Otherwise, significant prejudice or irreparable harm will result, and defendant will not have an adequate remedy upon reconsideration. Thus, we grant the Petition as one for removal. Accordingly, we dismiss defendant’s Petition as one for reconsideration, grant the Petition as one for removal, order that venue in case number ADJ15580972 is transferred to the Long Beach district office, that case numbers ADJ15580972 and ADJ12941950 are consolidated, and that WCJ Zoellner is assigned to all proceedings in case numbers ADJ15580972 and ADJ12941950. We rescind the Order and substitute a new Order that vacates the Order Dismissing

Lab. Code, §§ 5900(a), 5902, 5903

A petition for reconsideration may only be taken from a final order, decision, or award.

The WCJ's order vacating the dismissal was interlocutory and not final, so reconsideration was improper.

From the decision · page 3II. A petition for reconsideration may properly be taken only from a “final” order, decision, or award. (Lab. Code, §§ 5900(a), 5902, 5903.) A “final” order has been defined as one that either “determines any substantive right or liability of those involved in the case” (Rymer v. Hagler (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1171, 1180; Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (Pointer) (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 528, 534-535 [45 Cal.Comp.Cases 410]; Kaiser Foundation Hospitals v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (Kramer) (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 39, 45 [43 Cal.Comp.Cases 661]) or determines a “threshold” issue that is fundamental to the claim for benefits. (Maranian v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1070, 1075 [65 Cal.Comp.Cases 650].) Interlocutory procedural or evidentiary decisions, entered in the midst of the workers’ compensation proceedings, are not considered “final” orders. (Id. at p.

Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 10955(a)

Removal is an extraordinary remedy granted only if significant prejudice or irreparable harm will result and reconsideration is inadequate.

Removal was granted to consolidate venue and assignment to the same WCJ to avoid prejudice and inefficiency.

From the decision · page 4Removal is an extraordinary remedy rarely exercised by the Appeals Board. (Cortez v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 596, 599, fn. 5 [71 Cal.Comp.Cases 155]; Kleemann v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 274, 280, fn. 2 [70 Cal.Comp.Cases 133].) The Appeals Board will grant removal only if the petitioner shows that significant prejudice or irreparable harm will result if removal is not granted. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 10955(a); see also Cortez, supra; Kleemann, supra.) Also, the petitioner must demonstrate that reconsideration will not be an adequate remedy if a final decision adverse to the petitioner ultimately issues. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 10955(a).) Here, applicant initially filed an Application for Adjudication of Claim (Application) for a back injury sustained on February 3, 2017, while employed by defendant, Kelly Services. This case was assigned case number ADJ12941950 and venued in Long Beach.

Lab. Code, § 5700; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, §§ 10346(c), 10396(a), 10396(b)

Where a hearing is adjourned, it shall be continued and concluded by the same WCJ who previously heard it.

The same WCJ must continue to hear the consolidated cases to avoid prejudice and ensure fairness.

From the decision · page 5Subsection (b) further provides that consolidation of two or more cases may be ordered by the Appeals Board either on its own motion or based upon a petition filed by one of the parties. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 10396(b).) Here, two cases have been filed with respect to applicant involving potential liability by the same defendant, and alleging injury to the same body part, the back. As there are common issues of fact, to avoid duplicate or inconsistent orders, and for efficient utilization of judicial resources, we conclude that it is necessary to consolidate the two cases on our own motion. Section 5700 requires that where a hearing is adjourned it, “shall be continued to be heard by and shall be concluded and the decision made by the workers’ compensation judge who previously heard it.” (Lab. Code, § 5700.) WCAB Rule 10346(c), as enabled by section 5700 provides, “To the extent practicable and fair, supplemental proceedings shall be assigned to the workers’ compensation judge who heard the original proceedings.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 10346 (c).) 2 1F