Authorities as the decision cited them, with how this panel applied each one.
Labor Code Sections 112, 115, 5301, 5901, 5908.5, 5950; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, §§ 10320, 10330
Only the Appeals Board is statutorily authorized to issue a decision on a petition for reconsideration and must conduct de novo review of the merits.
The Appeals Board reviewed the petitions for reconsideration de novo and issued a decision after reconsideration.
From the decision · page 4Only the Appeals Board is statutorily authorized to issue a decision on a petition for
reconsideration. (Lab. Code, § 112, 115, 5301, 5901, 5908.5, 5950; see Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8,
§ 10320, 10330.)2 The Appeals Board must conduct de novo review as to the merits of the
petition and review the entire proceedings in the case. (Lab. Code, § 5906, 5908; see Lab. Code,
§ 5301, 5315, 5701, 5911.) Once a final decision by the Appeals Board on the merits of the
petition issues, the parties may seek review under Labor Code section 5950, but appellate review
is limited to review of the record certified by the Appeals Board. (Lab. Code, § 5901, 5951.)
Kaiser Foundation Hospitals v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 413; Truck Ins. Exchange v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (Kwok) (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 394; State Farm General Ins. Co. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (Lutz) (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 258; Dyer v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1376; Elkins v. Derby (1974) 12 Cal.3d 410; Shipley v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1104
The Appeals Board has broad equitable powers and may apply equitable tolling when administrative errors prevent timely action on petitions.
The Appeals Board applied equitable tolling due to administrative errors delaying action on the petition, ensuring due process rights were protected.
From the decision · page 5It is well-settled that the Appeals Board has broad equitable powers. (Kaiser Foundation
Hospitals v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 413, 418 [43
Cal.Comp.Cases 785] citing Bankers Indem. Ins. Co. v. Indus. Acc. Com. (1935) 4 Cal.2d 89, 94-
98 [47 P.2d 719]; see Truck Ins. Exchange v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (Kwok) (2016) 2
Cal.App.5th 394, 401 [81 Cal.Comp.Cases 685]; State Farm General Ins. Co. v. Workers' Comp.
Appeals Bd. (Lutz) (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 258, 268 [78 Cal.Comp.Cases 758]; Dyer v. Workers'
Comp. Appeals Bd. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1376, 1382 [59 Cal.Comp.Cases 96].) It is an issue of
fact whether an equitable doctrine such as laches applies. (Kwok, supra 2 Cal.App.5th at p. 402.)
The doctrine of equitable tolling applies to workers' compensation cases, and the analysis turns on
the factual determination of whether an opposing party received notice and will suffer prejudice if
equitable tolling is permitted. (Elkins v. Derby (1974) 12 Cal.3d 410, 412 [39 Cal.Comp.Cases
624].) As explained above, only the Appeals Board is empowered to make this factual
determination.4
Labor Code Section 5702
Parties may stipulate facts in writing and the Appeals Board may base findings and awards on such stipulations.
The Appeals Board relied on the 2013 stipulation for chiropractic treatment as binding and enforceable.
California Civil Code Section 1636
A contract must be interpreted to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties at the time of contracting.
The Appeals Board interpreted the stipulation to require 36 chiropractic treatments per year, not limited to a specific doctor.
From the decision · page 9"A contract must be so interpreted as to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties as
it existed at the time of contracting, so far as the same is ascertainable and lawful." (Cal. Civ. Code,
§ 1636.) Here the parties stipulated that applicant was to receive 36 chiropractic treatments per
year and that defendant would authorize Dr. Jalili to provide them. Defendant makes no legal
arguments in its Petition, and thus, it is impossible to determine under what legal theory defendant
argues that it has been relieved of the stipulation. The stipulation itself does not limit treatment to
Dr. Jalili. Had defendant sought such a limitation, it could have used appropriate restrictive
language (e.g., "only Dr. Jalili"). Such language does not exist in the present stipulation.