Riverside district office

Released decisions heard here

Newest released decisions whose case card names this venue. Each quotes the passage it turned on and links to the official PDF. Litigated tail — not a win rate for this office.

• ADJ14574913 · 2026-08-31 · Riverside District OfficeApportionmentdefendant prevailed

  Determinative passage · p.5defendant should be precluded from seeking a credit either partially, or in full, due to applicant’s allegation of employer negligence. Applicant argues on reconsideration that employer negligence was proven because the employer was aware of “Thirsty Thursdays” and failed to provide applicant a safe method of transport. (Petition for Reconsideration, p. 6, lines 25-28.) We agree with the WCJ that applicant has not established employer negligence solely based upon these allegations and thus, the employer is entitled to full credit. There is nothing in the record establishing that the male club member who was driving the car at the time of the accident was intoxicated. No police report is in evidence. Applicant did not testify that the driver had been drinking. According to applicant’s testimony the driver’s speed was the cause of the accident. It is unclear what connection “Thirsty Thursdays” has in this case as there is no evidence that intoxication was involved. Next, and even if we assume that the driver was intoxicated, applicant seeks to impart negligence upon the employer based upon the employer’s furnishing of alcohol to the driver. However, such civil liability is generally precluded under California law, and applicant argues no exception to the general exclusion. (Bus. & Prof., § 25602(b).) Accordingly, we deny reconsideration.

  Applicant failed to prove employer negligence; the employer was entitled to a credit for the civil recovery amount because the accident was caused by the speed of the driver, not intoxication or employer negligence.

  Official decision · page 5 →
• ADJ11937911 · 2026-08-25 · Riverside District OfficeOther disputed issuedefendant prevailed

  Determinative passage · p.4ckee residence as per her direction so that they could act in their capacity as domestic help at her Truckee residence. Issues set for determination at arbitration included whether Underwriters’ policy provided coverage for bodily injury/death; whether Underwriters’ policy provided workers’ compensation insurance coverage pursuant to Insurance Code section 11590; and if workers’ compensation insurance coverage was provided pursuant to Insurance Code section 11590, whether there existed other valid collectible workers compensation insurance coverage such that Underwriters’ coverage would not apply, or whether Underwriters would nonetheless be excluded from coverage because of the Motor Vehicle Exclusion included in said policy.

  The WCAB found that the Underwriters policy did not provide workers’ compensation coverage because State Farm had valid and collectible workers’ compensation insurance, and denied State Farm’s request for equitable contribution from Underwriters.

  Official decision · page 4 →
• ADJ11935974 · 2026-08-25 · Riverside District OfficeOther disputed issuedefendant prevailed

  Determinative passage · p.89.) The real question was whether there existed dual policies and if so, whether the policy at the Temecula location (State Farm) or the Truckee location (Underwriters) applied. State Farm argues “equitable contribution” requires application of both policies, but we do not find their argument to be persuasive or supported by existing workers’ compensation law. Further, although State Farm believes that both insurers share equal liability, under the clear language of Insurance Code section 11590 liability falls on the policy with existing, valid, and collectible workers’ compensation coverage—i.e. State Farm. Accordingly, we deny defendant State Farm’s Petition.

  The Appeals Board found that only the insurer with valid and collectible workers’ compensation coverage (State Farm) is liable under Insurance Code section 11590, rejecting State Farm’s argument for equitable contribution from Underwriters.

  Official decision · page 8 →
• ADJ16741171 · 2026-08-21 · Riverside District OfficeReconsideration / removalmoot

  Determinative passage · p.1Applicant has filed a petition for removal from the order setting the matter for trial issued on April 15, 2026, by the workers’ compensation administrative law judge (WCJ). Thereafter on May 21, 2026, the parties jointly requested the matter to proceed off calendar. Accordingly, we will dismiss the petition for removal as the issue raised is now moot. To the extent that the petition could have been construed as seeking disqualification of the WCJ, the petition did not comply with WCAB Rule 10960, and thus, we would have otherwise dismissed the petition as one seeking qualification. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 10960.)

  The petition was dismissed as moot because the parties jointly requested the matter to proceed off calendar, and it did not comply with WCAB Rule 10960 if construed as seeking disqualification of the WCJ.

  Official decision · page 1 →
• ADJ3521326 · 2026-08-19 · Riverside District OfficeReconsideration / removaldefendant prevailed

  Determinative passage · p.1Defendant has filed a petition for removal from the order appointing a bill review expert issued on April 16, 2026, by the workers’ compensation administrative law judge (WCJ). Defendant contends that further discovery through a bill review expert is unwarranted. We have received an Answer from lien claimant. The WCJ filed a Report and Recommendation on Petition for Removal (Report) recommending that we deny removal. We have considered the allegations of the Petition for Removal, the Answer, and the contents of the WCJ’s Report. Based on our review of the record and based upon the WCJ’s analysis of the merits of petitioner’s arguments in the WCJ’s Report, we will deny removal. Removal is an extraordinary remedy rarely exercised by the Appeals Board. (Cortez v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 596, 599, fn. 5 [71 Cal.Comp.Cases 155]; Kleemann v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 274, 280, fn.

  The Appeals Board found that the petitioner did not demonstrate substantial prejudice or irreparable harm if removal was denied, nor that reconsideration would be inadequate, based on the WCJ's analysis and the record.

  Official decision · page 1 →
• ADJ19682404 · 2026-08-03 · Riverside District OfficeAOE/COEremanded

  Determinative passage · p.7Turning to the first determination, no credible evidence was presented that a spider bite occurred at work on June 17, 2024. The only evidence of a spider bite occurring was Dr. Haghighinia’s medical report of October 3rd, 2024. In the report, Applicant self-reports a spider bite.... While an applicant can report a mechanism of injury to a doctor, the determination of whether that incident occurred is a question of fact. Central to such a determination is whether the testimony is credible. Here, Applicant did not testify at trial....Therefore, there is insufficient evidence to establish that a spider bite occurred at work on June 17, 2024. This alone is enough to not find AOE/COE in this case.

  The WCJ initially found no credible evidence of a spider bite at work and no substantial medical evidence establishing AOE/COE, but the Appeals Board found the medical-legal report by Dr. Haghighinia relevant and remanded for further proceedings to allow supplementation and further evidence.

  Official decision · page 7 →